Workable competition in health care: Prospects for the Dutch design by Schut, F.T. (Erik)
Sec. Sci. Med. Vol. 35, No. 12, pp. 1445-1455, 1992 
Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved 
0277-9536192 $5.00 + 0.00 
Copyright 0 1992 Pergamon Press Ltd 
WORKABLE COMPETITION IN HEALTH CARE: 
PROSPECTS FOR THE DUTCH DESIGN 
FREDERIK T. SCHUT 
Department of Health Policy and Management (BMG), Erasmus University Rotterdam, P.O. Box 1738, 
3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
Abstract-Since 1989 a gradual restructuring of the Dutch health care system is taking place to realize 
a multiple choice social health insurance system with workable competition among insurers and among 
health care providers. This paper investigates whether the structural change will induce the intended 
competition. An examination of the characteristics of the markets for health insurance, physician services 
and hospital services in the Netherlands points out that the scope for competition is limited. If competition 
is to work, rather extensive government regulation to monitor the conduct of both providers and insurers 
is needed. Without an effective antitrust policy a high degree of concentration and collusion is likely. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On both sides of the Atlantic, budgetary constraints 
and demographic and technological change have 
fuelled a quest for the Holy Grail of an efficient, 
equitable, affordable and innovative health care sys- 
tem. Because these goals are neither unambiguously 
defined nor completely compatible, the treasure is 
hard to find. 
Several Western European countries are looking 
for ways to restructure their healthcare systems in order 
to contain costs and to improve efficiency of health 
care delivery while maintaining universal coverage. 
The most radical health care reforms are proposed 
and are currently being implemented in the Nether- 
lands [l] and the United Kingdom [2]. Both reform 
proposals intend to strengthen the role of market 
forces in health care. However, where procompetitive 
adjustments in the U.K. are confined to health care 
delivery, they comprise both provision and finance of 
health care in the Netherlands. The different scope 
reflects the disparate health care financing systems in 
both countries. Obviously, competition among third 
party payers is a less straightforward policy option 
for the centralized tax funded British National Health 
Service than for the decentralized Dutch health in- 
surance system. 
This paper investigates the feasibility of workable 
competition in the Dutch health care system given 
its institutional features and historically determined 
*See Scherer and Ross [4, pp. 53-541 for a resume of the 
structural, conduct and performance criteria. Market 
performance is considered to be workable if productive 
efficiency approaches the best attainable, if output levels 
and product quality are responsive to consumer de- 
mands, if profits are just sufficient o reward investment, 
efficiency, and socially desirable innovation, and if pro- 
motional expenses are not excessive. 
market structure. Rather than to assess whether 
competition in the Dutch health care system may 
improve efficiency or contain costs the objective is to 
ascertain whether the intended competition among 
providers and among health insurers is likely to 
occur at all. 
The conditions in the health care industry are 
remote from those required for the realization of the 
perfect competition model. Hence, the Dutch health 
care reform is not aimed at attaining conventional 
welfare economics’ first-best or even second-best 
solutions to the allocation of health care resources. 
Instead, the objective of the reform is to create the 
conditions for ‘workable’ competition, resulting in an 
improvement of the overall performance of the health 
care industry. Although ‘competition’ is not defined 
explicitly in the health care reform proposals, its 
purport is actual or potential rivalry among providers 
and among health insurers, who are striving indepen- 
dently for the customer’s patronage. 
The phrase workable competition was coined by 
Clark, who provided the following generic definition: 
competition is rivalry in selling goods, in which each selling 
unit normally seeks maximum net revenue, under conditions 
such that the price or prices each seller can charge are 
effectively limited by the free option of the buyer to buy 
from a rival seller or sellers of what we think of as ‘the same’ 
product, necessitating an effort by each seller to equal 
or exceed the attractiveness of the others’ offerings to a 
sufficient number of sellers to accomplish the end in view 
13, p. 2431. 
For several decades industrial organization econom- 
ists have been trying to formulate appropriate criteria 
for judging the workability of competition. These 
efforts resulted in an extensive list of criteria of 
market structure and conduct which are expected 
to be associated with workable performance.* The 
resulting structure-conduct-performance paradigm 
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provides a framework (rather than a precise yard- 
stick) for assessing the likelihood of workable compe- 
tition in the Dutch health care industry. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, a bird’s- 
eye view of the Dutch health care system is provided. 
Then the main features of the Dutch health care 
reform are described. In subsequent sections the 
potential impact of the proposed reform on the 
performance of the markets for health insurance, 
physician services and hospital services are discussed. 
THE DUTCH HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
The health care system in the Netherlands is a 
complex mixture of elaborate government regulation 
and private enterprise. A distinguishing feature of the 
Dutch system is the strict separation of the financing 
and delivery of health care. Social insurance bodies 
are legally forbidden to employ providers or to run 
health care institutions and private health insurers 
have traditionally been anxious not to interfere with 
medical practice. Despite the predominance of pri- 
vate ownership, the Dutch health care system is 
heavily regulated by government. Particularly since 
the mid-seventies government tried to gain control 
of the allocation resources in health care. As a result 
the present Dutch health care system is dominated 
by government regulated cartels of providers and 
insurers. 
Health care financing 
The private origins of the health care financing 
system are exemplified by the fact that 32% of the 
population is currently privately insured for non- 
catastrophic risks, which is by far the highest percent- 
age in Western Europe. Besides, the compulsory 
social insurance system for the majority of the public 
is administered by an originally large-but now 
*In spite of the absence of government regulation, private 
health insurers charged community rated premiums until 
the 1970s. However, there have been other impediments 
to tailor premiums to risks, such as the threat to provoke 
government regulation, social goals of not-for-profit 
private health insurers, cartel arrangements among more 
than 20 for-profit private health insurers, and the fact 
that multiple-line insurance companies consider health 
insurance a lure to sell more profitable lines of insurance. 
During the 1970s the increasing cost of medical care 
made risk selection more and more profitable, which 
triggered a snowballing process of premium differen- 
tiation and market segmentation. 
tThe opportunities of risk selection in the Dutch private 
health insurance market are relatively large because 
69% of all insurance contracts are concluded with 
individual households [5]. By contrast in the U.S. about 
90% is employment-based group health insurance and 
more than two-thirds of employees are offered only one 
plan by their employers [6]. Nevertheless, even there 
increasing competition among health insurers seems to 
result in avoidance of high-risk non-group individuals [7] 
and of small business employee groups [8]. Moreover, 
risk-selection does occur when employees are offered a 
multiple option choice [9, lo]. 
rapidly diminishing-number of autonomous sick- 
ness funds. The only national scheme is the social 
insurance for catastrophic risks, enacted in 1967, 
which accounts for about 25% of total health care 
expenditures in 1990. 
Despite their private offspring sickness funds have 
become purely administrative bodies. Their eligible 
population is legally determined. Those who are 
obliged to enrol in sickness funds are primarily 
non-government employees, retirees, disabled and 
unemployed persons (and their dependents), with an 
income below a yearly adjusted specific level. Benefits 
package and premiums are uniformly dictated. Pre- 
miums are paid into a general fund, administered by 
the Sickness Fund Council, a central regulatory body. 
Until 1990 Sickness funds were not at financial risk 
because they are retrospectively fully reimbursed for 
the medical expenses of their enrolees. Furthermore, 
sickness funds had very limited power to influence 
medical practice because of a legal obligation to 
contract with all providers in their region at nation- 
ally determined uniform conditions. Finally, owing to 
a legally established territorial division of the market 
nearly all sickness funds had a regional monopoly. 
By contrast, more than 60 private insurers, both 
for-profit (stock) and not-for-profit (mutual) compa- 
nies, vigorously compete for a share of the remaining 
part of the health insurance market. Although com- 
petition among private health insurers is intense, it is 
directed to a rather small part of the insured popu- 
lation. For people over the age of 40, switching to 
another insurer is very expensive because insurers 
charge age-related entrance-premiums to mitigate 
adverse selection problems. Until the mid-eighties, 
there was little government regulation of the private 
insurance market. As a result of continuing price 
competition among private health insurers since the 
beginning of the seventies, the historically rather 
undifferentiated premium structure rapidly became 
increasingly risk-related.* Once initiated, the process 
of cream-skimming (by insurers) and adverse selec- 
tion (by consumers) induced an accelerating differen- 
tiation of premiums and benefit packages.? The rapid 
increasing premiums for the elderly and other high- 
risk groups were jeopardizing the preservation of 
universal coverage. Therefore, in 1986 the Health 
Insurance Access Act (WTZ) was adopted to main- 
tain the access to private health insurance. Private 
insurers were obliged to offer specified risk groups a 
comprehensive benefits package for a legally deter- 
mined maximum premium. The eligible population 
for this ‘standard benefits policy’ was extended in 
1989 to all people over the age of 65 and in 1991 to 
all private insureds who pay more than the maximum 
standard premium. Because the imposed maximum 
premium is far below the actuarial fair level, insurers 
incur losses on the standard benefits policies. These 
deficits are pooled and levied on all private insureds. 
Because in 1991 already 35% of total claims were 
caused by standard policy holders, private insurers 
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have become regulated administrative bodies for a 
substantial part of their business. So, independent 
from the health care reform, there is a clear tendency 
to socialize private health insurance in order to 
maintain universal financial access to health care. 
Health care delivery 
The health care delivery system is an even more 
confusing amalgam of government regulation and 
private initiative. Most physicians operate as a self- 
employed entrepreneur. There is a sharp distinction 
between general practitioners and medical specialists. 
Sickness funds and most private health insurers re- 
quire that patients must have a referral from a general 
practitioner before consulting a specialist. General 
practitioners are paid on a capitation basis for sick- 
ness fund patients and on a fee-for-service basis 
for privately insured patients. Regardless of the type 
of insurance most medical specialists are paid fee- 
for-service, whereas private fees are on average about 
twice as high as the fees for sickness fund patients. 
Fees and capitation payments are uniformly deter- 
mined through a legally prescribed negotiation pro- 
cess. Based on the Health Care Tariffs Act (WTG) of 
1980 a specially appointed autonomous body, the 
Central Office on Health Care Tariffs (COTG), sets 
out guidelines for the composition and calculation of 
tariffs. After approval by the government hese guide- 
lines are used by representative organizations of 
providers and insurers to negotiate the actual charges 
which in turn have to be approved by the COTG. The 
associations of general practitioners and specialists 
on the one hand and those of sickness funds and 
private health insurers on the other hand are desig- 
nated by law as representative negotiators. Although 
the government left very little room for true nego- 
tiations the formal institution of a bilateral monopoly 
considerably reinforced the power of the providers’ 
and insurers’ associations. 
In contrast to the strong interference with price 
of physician services, government did not attempt 
to control output. So, in spite of the price regulation 
the system is still open to cost inflation. However, by 
restricting the supply of physicians the government 
tried to control output indirectly. Since 1986 entry 
of general practitioners is controlled by a practice 
location regulation determining the minimum and 
maximum permitted practice size. In addition, the 
government can control the supply of medical 
specialists because specialist positions in hospitals 
need government approval in order to get reimburse- 
ment by the sickness funds. Furthermore, the govern- 
ment has restricted the entry to medical schools 
and supports the reduction of the resident training 
*The successive government proposals ‘Change Assured 
(1988) and ‘Working on Health Care Innovation’ (1990) 
delineate the objectives and time schedule of the health 
care reform. 
capacity which is controlled by the professional 
associations [1 11. 
Most hospitals in the Netherlands are established 
and maintained by voluntary organizations. Although 
only few hospitals are actually owned by either 
municipalities, provinces or the state, government 
influence upon the hospital sector is pervasive. Up 
till now, prices, production and capacity of Dutch 
hospitals are all subject to government regulation. 
Hospital capacity is strictly regulated by the Hospital 
Facilities Act (WZV). Before hospital construction 
may take place a government licence must be ob- 
tained. To establish production volume and prices, 
hospitals have to negotiate an annual budget with 
the local sickness funds and representatives of 
private health insurers. The room for negotiation 
is limited by the budget guidelines of the COTG. 
Once the annual budget has been approved by the 
COTG, hospital prices and production targets are 
determined. 
HEALTH CARE REFORM 
Since 1989 the Dutch health care system has been 
gradually moving towards a more competitive struc- 
ture. The restructuring is based on the recommen- 
dations by the so-called Dekker Committee in 
1987, which are laid down in a report entitled 
‘Willingness to Change’. With some revisions these 
proposals were endorsed by two consecutive coalition 
cabinets, together covering nearly the whole political 
spectrum.* 
For the following four main reasons the health 
care reform was thought to be necessary [l]. First, 
the results of detailed government regulation of 
prices and capacity were generally disappointing. 
Next, the present fragmented health care financing 
structure effectuates an inefficient allocation of 
resources because the choice of treatment is 
often more directed by the source of payment 
than by considerations of cost-effectiveness. A 
third reason for the proposed health care reform 
is the lack of incentives for efficiency in the present 
system. Neither sickness funds nor physicians 
benefit from a more efficient provision of health 
care. Finally, problems of securing access to health 
care due to the accelerating premium differentiation 
and risk-selection in the private health insurance 
sector contributed to the widespread belief that 
a reform of the health care financing system 
was required. At present the performance of 
the private health insurance market is con- 
sidered to be socially counterproductive. A lot of 
energy is spent on tracing the good risks relative 
to the existing premium structure, resulting in a 
socially undesirable reallocation of resources without 
any significant effect on the efficiency of medical 
care. 
The two key elements of the government’s 
proposals are a compulsory comprehensive ‘basic 
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insurance’ for all citizens and regulated competition 
among health care providers and among health insur- 
ers. The legally mandated benefit package of the basic 
insurance will cover about 96% of all medical 
expenses.* Hence, the present fragmented health in- 
surance system will be replaced by a uniform national 
insurance scheme. At least 85% of the cost of the 
basic benefit package will be paid for by income- 
related premiums, which are collected in a Central 
Fund. Health insurers will receive a premium replac- 
ing risk-adjusted payment per insured from the Cen- 
tral Fund. The amount of money an insurer receives 
depends on the actuarial group (e.g. age, sex, health 
status) the insured belongs to. The remaining part of 
the premium for the basic benefit package will be paid 
directly by the insured to the insurer. This flat rate 
premium may vary among insurers according to their 
ability to contain costs and should leave enough 
room for price competitiont The new payment 
mechanism will apply to both sickness funds and 
private health insurers. Eventually, the legal distinc- 
tion between sickness funds and private health insur- 
ers will be abolished and people will be free to choose 
whatever insurer they like. Insurers will be required 
to accept applicants irrespective of risk or health 
status. To ensure sufficient market stability this open- 
enrolment requirement will not apply to applicants 
who want to switch to another insurer less than 2 
years after their previous choice. 
Since 1990 the system of retrospective reimburse- 
ment of sickness funds is gradually replaced by the 
proposed prospective budgeting system. In the end, 
sickness funds will be totally at risk for the health 
care costs incurred by their insureds. Furthermore, by 
a pivotal amendment of the Sickness Fund Act in 
January 1992 the legally defined boundaries of the 
sickness fund regions have been removed and the 
obligation to contract with all providers at the same 
conditions has been abolished. 
*Of course a comprehensive compulsory benefit package 
implies some welfare loss since it requires low-risk 
groups to purchase too much health insurance. On the 
other hand a mandated broad benefit package may 
generate important welfare gains. First, lowest-cost sub- 
stitutes will not be ignored because they are not covered 
as could happen in case of a narrow benefit package. 
Second, the problem of potential free rider behavior is 
avoided. Finally, because of the standardized benefits, 
the information on price and quality of insurer services 
is relatively easy to compare. 
TNotice that in the U.S. the average mployer contribution 
to the health insurance premiums of their employees 
amounts to approximately 90% for individual coverage 
and 75% for family coverage [12]. Several studies indi- 
cate that employees are very sensitive to out-of-pocket 
premium differentials [13-l 51. 
$,In the Netherlands everal research projects are in progress 
to determine a workable formula [16]. Besides there is a 
fast growing literature on the same subject in the U.S., 
stemming from the need to develop a proper formula for 
paying HMOs to provide care to Medicare beneficiaries 
t171. 
The key function of the Central Fund is to combine 
equity and efficiency. Equity is introduced by income- 
related premiums that are independent of age and 
health status. By adjusting the progressiveness of 
the income-related premiums any desired level of 
cross-subsidies from high to low income groups 
can be established. The risk-adjusted payments from 
the Central Fund to the insurers should neutralize 
insurers’ incentives for preferred risk-selection 
(i.e. selection of favorable risk groups relative to 
the premium) and provide them with incentives to 
improve the efficiency of health care de1ivery.t 
The mandated basic benefit package will not be 
described in institutional but in functional terms. 
What matters is no longer the type of provider but 
only the type of care that is covered. This is expected 
to increase the substitutability of health care services. 
Insurers are supposed to become a powerful prudent 
buyer on behalf of their insureds, collecting and 
using information about provider behavior to select 
efficient and high quality health care providers. The 
basic idea is to provide consumers and representative 
consumer organizations with incentives and infor- 
mation to select cost-effective health insurers, which 
in turn get freedom to negotiate contracts with 
providers. If there is enough competition in both the 
market for health insurance and that for health care 
delivery, consumers hould motivate insurers to select 
cost-effective providers. By the abolition of the legal 
contracting obligation for sickness funds and the 
partial deregulation of fees of health care providers 
in 1992, two important preconditions for selective 
contracting have recently been fulfilled. The effect 
of these measures will be noticeable after 2 years’ 
transition period, during which the existing contracts 
have to be maintained. 
The health care reform proposals comprise a 
considerable deregulation of the hospital industry. 
First, the Hospital Facilities Act will be confined 
to the planning of large hospital facilities. Next, 
negotiations between hospitals and health insurers 
will no longer be subject to detailed guidelines. The 
transition to a system of free negotiations will be 
gradual because it will take time to correct the 
currently distorted purely administrative hospital 
prices. Therefore, in the short run the recently refined 
global budgeting system will be maintained. The 
government aims at full implementation of the 
reforms by the beginning of 1995. However, given the 
number of complicated problems that have to be 
solved this time horizon appears to be too optimistic. 
PROSPECTS FOR WORKABLE COMPETITION 
Even if the generation of a proper risk-adjusted 
payment system to compensate insurers will succeed 
and satisfactory solutions to other technical problems 
will be found, the question remains whether the 
restructuring of the health care system will indeed 
lead to workable competition among the participants. 
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Table I. Dutch private health insurance: market concentration in 1986 and 1992’ 
Market share Cumulative 
Largest ten (groups of) health insurers (% premiums) market share 
1986 1992 1986 1992 1986 1992 
1 Zilveren Kruis Zilveren Kruis/AVCB 15.4 23.3 15.4 23.3 
2 OHRA Nuts-AEGON 1.9 14.7 23.3 38.0 
3 VGZ MultiZorg 6.8 14.1 30.1 52.1 
4 AEGON OHRAjZHV 5.7 11.4 35.8 63.5 
5 Nuts VGZ/AMEV 5.4 7.5 41.2 71.0 
6 VGNN Interpolis/Nw-Rdamb 5.4 6.5 46.6 11.5 
7 Interpolis VGNN 4.1 5.4 50.7 82.9 
8 Delta Lloyd Univ& 3.1 3.6 53.8 86.5 
9 NNVS CZ Groep 3.0 3.0 56.8 89.5 
IO UAP Zwolsche Algemene 2.9 2.3 59.1 91.8 
‘The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) increases from 545 in 1986 to 1252 in 1992. 
bin 1991 Interpolis and AVCB announced to merge within a 2 years’ period, which would raise the 
market share of the leading. health insurance group to about 30% and the HHI to 1554. 
Source: Ref. [20]. 
An important weakness of the proposals is that a 
clear link between structure and conduct is missing. 
The hidden presupposition seems to be that a dereg- 
ulation of the present legal barriers to competition 
will compel the desired conduct and performance. 
However, the same incentives that are supposed to 
result in competition may also induce collusion with 
adverse effects on performance. The historically de- 
termined structure of the health care industry, which 
is dominated by cartels that are often instituted or 
backed by the government, facilitates anticompetitive 
conduct. A closer look at the features of the markets 
for health insurance, physician services and hospital 
services will learn that competition is all but straight- 
forward. 
The market for health insurance 
The main reason for reforming the health in- 
surance system is to create the necessary conditions 
and incentives for a workable species of competition 
which should be directed at controlling the cost of 
medical care. On the one hand this implies that health 
insurers should possess enough market power to 
affect the price or quality of medical care.* On the 
other hand, if a health insurer obtains too much 
buying power, the adverse welfare effects could be 
considerable [18]. A dominant health insurer can 
safeguard his position by using his market power to 
deny medical inputs or to raise their prices to other 
insurers. Hence, monopsony could become a perma- 
nent source of market power. This might not be a 
problem for unconcentrated health insurance mar- 
kets, where a dominant position may be very difficult 
to obtain. However, if for reasons other than market 
*In the evident absence of perfect competition among 
providers, perfect competition among health insurers is 
not desirable because as price takers they cannot exert 
any influence on medical practice. 
tBoth sickness funds and Blue plans are not-for-profit 
organizations with a historically determined large 
regional market share; both provide service benefits 
instead of indemnifying medical expenses and sell no 
other type of insurance. In addition, the majority of the 
insurers of both types have agreed not to compete with 
each other. 
performance some health insurers have acquired 
a dominant position, the prospects for workable 
competition among health insurers might be limited. 
The Dutch health care reform cannot start at point 
zero, but has to be built on the historically deter- 
mined structure of the health insurance industry. This 
implies that after the reform, sickness funds will be in 
an advantageous tarting position because ach sick- 
ness fund is located in a separate region in which they 
typically have more than 60% market share. More- 
over, the health care reform induced a merger wave 
in the sickness fund sector. Anticipating the loss of 
their present regional monopolies many sickness 
funds decided to merge. As a consequence the num- 
ber of independent sickness funds decreased from 46 
in 1987 to only 26 in 1991. Since most of the mergers 
involve sickness funds with adjacent working areas 
the regional market power of sickness funds is 
further strengthened. Hence the remaining sickness 
funds may already have a critical buying leverage 
to drive other insurers out of the local market place. 
The future market position of the sickness funds 
may correspond in many aspects to the one presently 
taken by Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans in the 
U.S.t In response to the increasing competition 
from HMOs and PPOs in the eighties, several Blue 
plans tried to eliminate competitors by using their 
monopsony power in various ways. Allegations of 
anticompetitive behavior led to a number of federal 
antitrust cases against the Blues [19]. Similar prob- 
lems may arise with respect to the sickness funds. 
Contrary to the sickness fund sector, the market 
for private health insurance was very unconcentrated. 
The geographic market is much larger because pri- 
vate health insurers can sell their policies all over the 
country. As shown in Table 1 in 1986 the largest four 
private health insurers together had a market share of 
only 35% [20]. 
Dutch private health insurers are primarily per- 
forming a risk pooling function. Apart from this 
‘pure’ insurance service, health insurers can provide 
another service, which can be defined as ‘cost 
containment’, ‘expenditure control’ or ‘limitation of 
moral hazard’ [21, p. 2371. As all Dutch private 
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insurers cover medical expenses rather than providing 
indemnity insurance, the rationale for cost contain- 
ment is evident. Despite this fact, very few insurers 
actively try to manage care for the sake of expendi- 
ture control. The main reason seems to be that 
the originally community rated premium structure 
still leaves ample room for selecting favorable risks. 
Consequently preferred risk-selection is considered 
to be more profitable and less risky than engaging in 
the unknown area of managing medical practice. 
Thus conceiving health insurance as a joint product, 
consisting of variable proportions of risk spreading 
and cost control, the Dutch private health insurance 
market is strongly biased towards the former type of 
service.* Since ‘pure’ insurance services are easy to 
imitate and require limited investments, entry barriers 
are low [21, p. 2491 and economies of scale virtually 
absent [22]. Hence, it is unlikely that any insurer will 
be able to obtain or retain market power. 
The reform of the Dutch health insurance system 
will have a profound impact on the market structure. 
If the risk-adjusted payment system to compensate 
insurers can prevent preferred risk-selection, the main 
activity of the health insurance business may become 
expenditure control. For several reasons the cost 
controlling function requires a considerable mini- 
mum scale. First, investments necessary to manage 
care, such as recruiting and training staff and 
purchasing computerized information systems, will 
increase capital requirements. Significant economies 
of scale are observed in undertaking cost containment 
programs by insurers [23]. The increasing economies 
of scale may put up a barrier to entry for new firms. 
Second, insurers need enough bargaining power on 
a local level to negotiate favorable contracts with 
health care providers. Since bargaining power will 
be determined by local market share, the relevant 
geographic market for health insurance will shrink. 
Instead of the present national market, the future 
health insurance industry will consist of a number of 
regional or local submarkets. 
In order to survive in such a market private health 
insurers are actively searching for strategies to in- 
crease regional market power. Some of the largest 
private health insurers that were once established by 
sickness funds (e.g. Zilveren Kruis and VGZ) have 
signed agreements to merge with a number of these 
sickness funds when the legal separation of the two 
types of insurers is abolished. Since the beginning of 
the health care reform in 1989, many insurers with a 
relatively small share of the health insurance market 
have decided to sell their policies to one of the larger 
health insurers. Moreover, most of these; larger health 
*In the American group health insurance market, where 
opportunities for preferred risk selection are less exten- 
sive than in the individual insurance market, managed 
care is a rapidly growing activity. In 1988 72% of 
Americans with employer-sponsored coverage were 
enroled in a managed care plan, as compared with 59% 
the year before [12]. 
insurance companies are involved in mergers or seek- 
ing some other form of co-operation. In 1992, seven 
major multiple-line insurance companies combined 
forces to establish MultiZorg, an organization for 
joint negotiating contracts with health care providers, 
joint purchasing of drugs and medical devices, and 
for automation support. Owing to this clustering 
of health insurance activities, market concentration 
in the private health insurance industry increased 
dramatically (see Table 1). As a consequence, the 
present private health insurance market is dominated 
by four groups of private health insurers. 
As remarked earlier, health insurers must have 
enough countervailing buying power to be able to 
influence price, quantity and quality of medical care. 
Hence, particularly among private health insurers the 
current wave of mergers and joint ventures might be 
desirable. On the other hand, an ongoing market 
concentration, especially among sickness funds or 
among sickness funds and allied private insurers, 
could result in unbalanced monopsony power with 
adverse welfare consequences. At present the Dutch 
government cannot prevent such mergers because the 
antitrust law does not contain provisions to prohibit 
mergers or takeovers [24]. 
The market for physician services 
The Dutch market for physician services has a 
long-standing tradition of anticompetitive self- 
regulation. In the twentieth century the medical 
profession has acquired a substantial control over 
entry, production, price-setting and financing. 
Market behavior is regulated by collective bargaining 
and binding ethical codes of powerful professional 
associations. 
The market power of the medical profession not 
only stems from self-regulation but, as described 
earlier, is also strongly enhanced by government 
regulation. One of the most important sources of 
market power of physicians is the legal obligation for 
sickness funds to contract with all physicians in their 
region on nationally determined uniform conditions. 
Before this contracting obligation was legalized by 
the Sickness Funds Decree of 1941, it was the main 
issue during the pre-war ‘battle’ between physicians 
and independent sickness funds. After the Decree 
physicians no longer needed to compete for a 
contract with a sickness fund. The main argument 
of the medical profession for the non-selective con- 
tracting obligation for sickness funds was a guaran- 
teed free choice of doctor by the patient. Although 
patients are in principle free to choose providers 
(within the boundaries of a sickness fund region), 
they are at the same time deprived of any right 
or incentive to select providers on the basis of price 
and efficiency. In the U.S. these anticompetitive 
effects of the ‘free choice’ ethics of the American 
Medical Association led to the somewhat counterin- 
tuitive ruling of the Federal Trade Commission in 
1979 and the following 1982 Supreme Court decision 
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that the free choice requirement violated the antitrust 
laws [24]. 
Having regard to the past, the abolition of the legal 
contracting obligation for sickness funds and the 
partial deregulation of fees of health care providers 
are unprecedented. Another noteworthy step is the 
repeal of the practice location regulation for general 
practitioners in 1992, which removes an important 
legal entry barrier. These measures should pave the 
way for competition among providers in order to get 
favorable contracts with health insurers. 
However, competition is not the only and perhaps 
not even the most likely response to the proposed 
reforms. At present, individual or local groups of 
physicians lack any bargaining skills because of the 
legalized collective negotiations on tariffs and other 
contractual terms. The Royal Dutch Medical Associ- 
ation (KNMG) has stipulated that in a future health 
care system collectively negotiated contracts with 
insurers should be binding for all providers and 
insurers, resulting in uniform prices on a national 
level and other uniform contractual conditions on the 
regional level. Furthermore, the medical profession is 
anticipating the reforms by reducing the resident 
training capacity of medical specialists and general 
practitioners, thereby raising entry barriers and creat- 
ing scarcity. As a consequence of the manpower 
planning by the professional associations, the excess 
supply of general physicians and medical specialists 
during the eighties was virtually eliminated at the 
beginning of the nineties. Ironically, for fear of 
supplier induced demand government policy still 
encourages and supports capacity reduction of pro- 
fessional education. These conflicting policy objec- 
tives demonstrate that Dutch health care policy finds 
itself in a transition period from a planning-oriented 
towards a market-oriented approach. However, by a 
persistent reliance on familiar planning tools, policy- 
makers run the risk to frustrate the workability of the 
market oriented approach in advance. Besides, the 
opportunities to counteract anticompetitive physician 
*The Hospital Facilities Act requires anew general hospital 
to have a minimum size of 175 beds, in order to 
guarantee the availability of two full-time medical 
specialists of each of the six so-called ‘core specialties’. 
tGiven the rapid consolidation of U.S. hospitals during the 
eighties, the proportion of hospital monopolies has 
probably been increased since 1972. 
SBesides, the propensity to travel may differ in the two 
countries, probably being higher in the U.S. On the other 
hand, in the U.S. not only patients and their visitors 
have to travel, but also their community-based phys- 
icians, which is very unusual in the Netherlands. 
Robinson and Luft [28] assume the willingness of the 
attending physician to travel to be the major restriction 
on size of the hospital market, 
$The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is the sum of the squared 
market shares of all firms in the same relevant product 
and geographic market. The index varies from approx 0 
in an atomistic market to 10,000 in a pure monopoly. An 
index of 1800 corresponds to a market with about 6 
equally sized firms. 
behavior through the application of antitrust laws are 
limited as long as the Netherlands remains the cartels’ 
Land of Cockaigne within Europe [24]. 
The market for hospital services 
The nature of the hospital market provides hospi- 
tals with a substantial market power. The service area 
of most hospitals is limited to an approximate 15 mile 
(24 km) radius [25]. Moreover, hospitals have a con- 
siderable minimum size, which severely restricts the 
maximum number of hospitals within the same geo- 
graphic market.* Accordingly, the hospital industry 
is characterized by a high level of market concen- 
tration. In comparison to other countries, however, 
the Dutch hospital industry is relatively unconcen- 
trated thanks to the high population density. 
As shown in Table 2, a natural monopoly is a rare 
phenomenon in the Dutch hospital market [26,27]. 
Nine out of ten hospitals in the urbanized Dutch 
Randstad area, accounting for about 45% of the 
population, have more than ten potential competitors 
in their vicinity. By contrast, already in 1972 nearly 
a quarter of U.S. hospitals had no potential competi- 
tor within a 24 km radius.? Apart from the large 
metropolitan areas with more than 30 competing 
hospitals, the majority of U.S. hospitals+ven in 
the densely populated mid-Atlantic area-face little 
competition. However, it should be noticed the actual 
competitive pressure on hospitals may be higher than 
suggested by these figures because of the rapidly 
growing number of outpatient substitutes for some 
hospital services in the U.S.$ 
Although the Dutch hospital market structure 
seems to be more suitable for a market-oriented 
approach than the American, the market concen- 
tration is still high as compared to most other 
industries. According to the 1984 Merger Guidelines 
of the U.S. Department of Justice, markets with a 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of more than 
1800 are regarded as highly concentrated.9 Hence, 
Table 2. Distribution of hospitals by the number of other hospitals 
within 24 km (15 miles): Comparison between the United States and 
the Netherlands” 
US. Mid-Atlanticb Netherlands Randstad’ 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
23. I 6.7 2.7 2.9 
Other 
hospitals 
0 
1 17.6 9.3 
2-4 21.0 18.0 
5-10 12.0 16.2 
11-15 4.4 2.5 
16-20 2.6 3.5 
21-25 3.6 1.9 
2630 2.0 4.0 
>30 13.7 38.0 
Total number 
of hospitals 6520 734 
6.1 0.0 
25.0 1.4 
21.6 5.7 
14.2 25.7 
21.7 45.7 
8.8 18.6 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
148 70 
‘Data relate to 1972 for the United States and 1988 for the 
Netherlands; U.S. hospitals in Hawaii and Alaska are not 
included because of the unique geographic features. 
bStates of New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. 
‘Provinces of North-Holland, South-Holland and Utrecht (account- 
ing for 45% of total Dutch population). 
Sources: Ref. [26] for U.S. data; Ref. [27] for computation of the 
Dutch figures. 
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Table 3. Hospital market concentration in the Netherlands in 1984 and 1988’ 
Market share Hertindahl 
Number of hospitals Top two (C,) Index (HHI) 
I984 1988 1984 1988 1984 1988 
Change in 
HHI from 
19841988 
01 Groningen 10 9 
02 Leewarden 8 6 
03 Zwolle 6 6 
04 Enschede 6 5 
05 Apeldoorn 5 3 
06 Arnhem I1 10 
07 Nijmegen 3 3 
08 Amersfoort 5 5 
09 Utrecht’ 11 10 
10 Hilversum* 5 3 
11 Alkmaar* 4 3 
12 Haarlem’ 8 8 
13 Amsterdam* 16 13 
14 Leyden* 4 4 
15 The Hague* 8 8 
16 Gouda* 2 2 
17 Rotterdam* 12 12 
18 Dordrecht’ 6 4 
19 Middelburg 7 5 
20 Breda 7 6 
21 Tilburg 3 3 
22 Den Bosch 6 6 
23 Eindhoven 6 5 
24 Roermond 4 4 
25 Maastricht 6 5 
41.0 
34.0 
60.9 
51.7 
45.3 
26.9 
89.1 
59.3 
32.8 
55.9 
67.7 
39.3 
29.1 
73.7 
41.8 
100.0 
31.1 
57.1 
49.0 
45.6 
84.7 
50. I 
47.0 
62.8 
52.4 
Mean 6.8 5.9 53.1 59.1 2220 
SD 3.2 2.9 18.5 18.9 1040 
42.4 1390 
55.3 1430 
58.6 2320 
52.2 2160 
79.8 2030 
37.0 1000 
89.6 4180 
60.8 2530 
37.2 1140 
83.6 2370 
81.3 3160 
38.8 1440 
33.1 920 
72.6 3350 
41.1 1530 
100.0 5250 
31.3 1030 
63.3 2170 
65.8 1820 
48.8 1730 
85.8 3880 
48.9 2050 
48.0 1910 
65.2 2720 
56.1 2080 
1470 80 
2280 850 
2230 -90 
2250 90 
3620 1590 
1220 220 
4260 80 
2620 90 
1230 90 
3790 1420 
3830 670 
1430 -10 
1070 150 
3250 -100 
1520 -10 
5150 -100 
1050 20 
2760 590 
2660 840 
1990 260 
4120 240 
2010 -40 
2100 190 
2770 50 
2410 330 
2520 300 
1090 444 
‘Market concentration is measured by yearly hospital admissions. 
*Health regions in the Randstad area. 
Source: Ref.[20]. 
in those markets even relatively small mergers 
are judged by their competitive impact. If hospitals 
are regarded as economic units providing a cluster 
of services* and the legally defined Dutch ‘Health 
regions’ are taken as the relevant geographic hospital 
*For the time being, this assumption is appropriate for 
the present Dutch hospital market, because there are 
little or no substitutes for their services available outside 
the hospital. In the U.S. a more differentiated product 
definition might be necessary, since several hospital 
services are also provided by a rapidly growing number 
of ambulatory surgery centers, primary care diagnostic 
centers, and home health care agencies [29]. 
tHealth regions were defined for planning purposes in the 
Dutch Hospital Facilities Act. They were originally 
determined by minimizing the patient flow across their 
boundaries. The applied methodology corresponds to 
the Elzinga-Hogarty approach, by which a market is 
expanded until the LIFO (little in from outside) and 
LOFI (little out from inside) statistics exceed some 
critical cutoff level (usually 75 or 90%) [30]. Although 
the Elzinga-Hogarty approach is not free from criticism 
[31], this might be largely met by adjusting patient flow 
statistics for patients who leave the region only for 
specialized treatment at tertiary care hospitals [32, 
pp. 143-1451. When applied to the Dutch Health Re- 
gions, the average 1986 LIFO and LOFI percentages, 
adjusted for the share of academic hospitals, amount to 
91.6 and 90.8 respectively (standard deviations being 4.5 
and 4.2%) [33]. 
IBoth hospital area definitions are constructed for planning 
of health facilities. Comparison is justified because ach 
market definition aims to delineate coherent hospital 
service areas that include the majority of buyers and 
sellers. 
markets,? most regional hospital markets in the 
Netherlands are highly concentrated, as shown in 
Table 3. 
Despite the already high level of regional market 
concentration, the Dutch hospital industry is under- 
going a rapid consolidation process. From 1967 to 
1984, 93 hospitals were involved in 43 mergers. After 
1984 the average market share of the two largest 
hospitals in each Health Region increased by more 
than 10% in 4 years’ time (see Table 3). During the 
last decade, the Dutch government actively supported 
the consolidation of hospitals. Hospital mergers were 
considered a useful vehicle to reduce the existing 
excess capacity. 
Hospital mergers could be defended as promoting 
technical efficiency. However, neither American [34] 
nor Dutch [35] empirical research as found substan- 
tial economies of scale in the production of hospital 
services. The general conclusion is that economies 
of scale may exist for small hospitals but that 
moderate- and large-size hospitals can generally be 
characterized by constant returns to scale. Thus 
proceeding consolidations of Dutch hospitals seems 
to be at odds with the objectives of the health care 
reform. 
The observation that the HHI statistics exceed 
1800 in more than 70% of the Dutch hospital 
markets, indicates a limited potential for workable 
competition among hospitals. Nevertheless, the 
conditions for competition are still considerably 
better than in California, as illustrated in Table 4 
PO, W$ 
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Table 4. Comparison ofthe He~ndshl-Hirschman indices of Dutch 
Health Regions in 1988 and Californian Health Facilities Planning 
Areas in 1980 
Dutch Health Regions 
HHI Ntlnlber % 
<IWO 0 0.0 
100&1799 7 28.0 
18OG2499 7 28.0 
25004999 10 40.0 
5OoO-9999 1 4.0 
10,000 0 0.0 
Total 25 lo0 
Sources: Refs [20,36]. 
Californian HFPAs 
Number % 
2 1.5 
18 13.2 
7 5.1 
41 30.1 
24 17.6 
44 32.4 
136 100 
While (natural) monopolies are a common feature 
of the Californian hospital industry, given that nearly 
one third of the Health Facilities Planning Areas 
(HFPAs) have an index of 10,000, they are non- 
existent in the Dutch hospital industry. 
This comparison is particularly interesting because 
the proposed reform of the Dutch hospital market 
corresponds to a considerable degree to the market- 
oriented policy for hospitals in California. In June 
1982 the Californian legislature passed a law permit- 
ting private insurers to contract selectively with hos- 
pitals. The legislation paved the way for Preferred 
Provider Organizations, which channel beneficiaries 
to selected providers, in exchange for a premium 
discount or other amenities. In less than 5 years, 
PPOs acquired a 25% share of the Californian health 
insurance market. The first results of empirical re- 
search into the effects of the Californian experiment 
indicate that the selective contracting provision had 
led to substantial price competition among hospitals, 
resulting in hospital cost containment relative to 
the previous period and the rest of the United States 
[28, 371. Furthermore, this effect was found to 
be positively related to the number of competing 
hospitals in an area. The cost-reducing effect of the 
Californian market-oriented program appears to be 
particularly strong in areas where hospitals have 
more than 10 neighbors within 24 km. This obser- 
vation might be an important indication of the 
effectiveness of the Dutch reforms, since it applies 
to more than 40% of Dutch hospitals. As nearly 
all of these hospitals are located in the Randstad 
area, the prospects for workable competition in the 
Dutch hospital market clearly are most favorable in 
this region. However, the results of the Californian 
experience should be interpreted with caution. The 
observed price competition among hospitals might 
well be only a short term response to the change in 
*In general, antitrust authorities have not been very success- 
ful in challenging mergers, particularly not in areas beset 
with foreign competition. The apparent success in chal- 
lenging hospital mergers stems from the structural 
characteristics of hospital markets. Compared to most 
manufacturing industries, economically meaningful 
hospital markets are easier to isolate, because of their 
relatively easy-to-define products and geographic 
boundaries. 
legislation. A case study of a Californian metropoli- 
tan city shows that the selective contracting by insur- 
ers induced a dramatic change in the structure of a 
local hospital market [38]. Through affiliation and 
merger, hospitals tried to remain in control of the 
market-place. In a few years’ time the original 14 
independent hospitals had grouped themselves into 
four hospital systems. The horizontal mergers pro- 
vided the critical mass for a following wave of vertical 
integrations to control the supply to the hospital. 
Eventually, the former highly competitive market was 
transformed into a differentiated oligopoly in which 
price competition played a minor role. 
In contrast to the Netherlands, U.S. antitrust laws 
provide rather powerful policy instruments to prevent 
mergers. In the last decade, competitive pressure on 
American hospitals has increased dramatically, due 
to the more and more ‘prudent buying’ by health 
insurers, HMOs, PPOs and the federal government 
(which introduced a prospective payment system for 
Medicare beneficiaries). The growing competitive 
pressure induced a 4-fold increase in the number of 
acquisitions or consolidations, rising to roughly 200 
a year in the early 1980s [32, p. 931. According to the 
American Hospital Association 79 hospital mergers 
occurred between 1982 and 1986. At the same time, 
antitrust authorities made clear that hospital mergers 
would be reviewed within the same antitrust frame- 
work that applies to any acquisition. In fact, hospital 
mergers soon became the focus of the Federal 
Trade Commission and Justice Department merger 
activities.* In several cases these activities resulted in 
the divestiture of the challenged hospital merger. 
Since 1988, for the first time also consolidations of 
nonprofit hospitals have been challenged. Although 
the evidence is not quite clear, the nonprofit status 
of merging hospitals does not appear to impose a 
significant restriction on the antitrust review of their 
actions [32, pp. 112-1131. 
At present, the Dutch government has no policy 
instruments to counteract a further consolidation of 
the Dutch hospital industry, which will be induced by 
the reforms. Besides, the opportunities for demand 
substitution outside the hospital are still very small. 
The lack of sufficient outpatient care substitutes adds 
to the potential anticompetitive impact of a hospital 
merger. However, this may turn out to be primarily 
a short-term problem, because the health care reform 
will encourage effective demand substitution in 
several ways. First, the proposed deregulation of 
the Hospital Facilities Act will create room for 
the establishment of free-standing outpatient clinics 
(which at present are legally tied to a hospital). 
Second, the choice of the most cost-effective type 
of service is prompted by incorporating nearly all 
potential substitutes for hospital services in a single 
comprehensive benefit package. 
Another structural feature of hospital markets 
which limits competition is the existence of consider- 
able entry barriers. Until now, entry to the Dutch 
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hospital market is blocked by the Hospital Facilities 
Act. However, when the proposed deregulation is 
effectuated, entry will be much easier for most less 
specialized hospital services. For the more specialized 
clinical services entry will remain difficult, even 
apart from the remaining legal barriers. The techno- 
logical requirements of highly specialized hospitals 
demand a planning and construction period of 
between 4 and 9 years [32, p. 1541. So the period 
of entry will be too long to withhold hospitals 
from raising prices above competitive levels. More- 
over, exit from the hospital market is very costly 
because investments cannot be liquidated without 
substantial osses. The fact that entry does not mean 
a credible threat for many hospital services, implies 
that government should keep a sharp eye on collusion 
and abuse of dominant positions to keep competition 
workable. 
CONCLUSION 
The Dutch design of a competitive and equitable 
health care system is gradually leaving the drawing 
board. The actual implementation of the theoretical 
concepts is a very complicated process. The creation 
of the necessary conditions for workable competition 
in health care not only requires a reshape of the 
structure of the health care market, but also a 
dramatic change of conduct of all participants. On 
the one hand, the structural preconditions for a 
market-oriented health policy in the Netherlands may 
be relatively good as compared to other industrialized 
countries, because of the high population density 
and the large number of private institutions. On 
the other hand, the historically determined structure 
of the health care financing and delivery system, 
the long-standing tradition of anti-competitive self- 
regulation and of collective bargaining by govern- 
ment protected cartels of providers and insurers, put 
significant constraints on the possibility of workable 
competition. 
The analysis of the Dutch health care market 
shows that if competition is to result in workable 
performance outcomes, government should set 
appropriate rules of the game. At least, an effective 
antitrust policy is required to be able to counteract 
anticompetitive behavior and monopolization. For 
health care markets in particular Clark’s statement 
seems to hold that “to keep competition healthy 
requires the traditional eternal vigilance” [39, p. 4621. 
Several countries are presently considering market 
oriented reforms of their health care systems. Because 
the potential success of a market-oriented health care 
reform crucially depends on the structural, behav- 
ioral and institutional features of the health care 
system, careful analysis of these conditions should 
precede a decision to implement such reforms. Even- 
tually, the Dutch ‘natural experiment’ may provide a 
crucial test of the feasibility of workable competition 
in multiple-insurer health care systems. 
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